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DR. J. A. SMITH, JR., 
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, 
and JANE DOES. NOS. I through V, 
Ex Rel The Law Firm of 
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER 
Defendants-Respondents 
CASE NO. 20873 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, District Judge, awarding Law Firm their reasonable 
attorney's fees for services rendered in the amount of 
$13,314.78. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent Law Firm seeks affirmation of the Order of Judge 
Rokich awarding attorney's fees, plus remand to the District 
Court for the determination and award of appropriate fees, 
•^ All references to "Law Firm" are to the Respondent, the law firm 
of Ungricht, Randle & Deamer of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
interest and costs of respondent Law Firm on appeal, which 
appellants are contractually obligated to pay. 
FACTS 
Respondent Law Firm general ly agrees with appel lant ' s facts 
but adds the addi t ional facts not set forth in appel lants1 Brief 
as follows: 
1. Appellant Elmer Lee Ph i l l i p s was operated on for cancer 
of t h e b l a d d e r . During the c o u r s e of t h e o p e r a t i o n , t he 
at tending physician or people under his control l e f t a sponge in 
p l a i n t i f f . This sponge was subsequent ly removed t h r ee or four 
weeks l a t e r upon p l a i n t i f f ' s complaining of c o m p l i c a t i o n s , 
i nc lud ing d i scomfor t and fever . Upon the subsequent ope ra t i on 
appel lant alleged that the doctor and the medical center jarred 
loose a tube from the kidneys to the b l adde r , thereby causing 
p l a i n t i f f to suffer further complicat ions, including a leakage of 
urine in the in t e r io r cavity of his body. There were addi t ional 
a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t p l a i n t i f f was subsequen t ly m i s t r e a t e d and 
m a l t r e a t e d by nurses and a t t e n d i n g doc to r s dur ing the recovery 
phase . (Record, p.59) . 
2. Mr. P h i l l i p s was a gentleman in h i s s i x t i e s , who had 
been on Social Security d i s a b i l i t y since the 1940s, was employed 
as a j a n i t o r a t h i s wi fe ' s nurs ing home, and spent t ime in 
purchas ing and f ix ing old au tomobi l e s . He was dying of cancer 
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and had been given an e ighteen-month l i f e expectancy by the 
attending physicians.2 He had no subs tan t ia l salary h is tory and 
had no dependent c h i l d r e n as a l l of h i s c h i l d r e n were grown and 
marr ied . His wife was independent ly wealthy and was not 
supported by him. (Record, p.59) 
3. In November, 1983, respondent Law Firm was approached by 
appel lants to f i l e a malpractice lawsuit against the University 
Medical Center and Dr. J . A. Smith, J r . 
4. Appel lan ts signed a w r i t t e n agreement (a t t ached as 
Exh ib i t "C" to a p p e l l a n t ' s Br ief ) r e t a i n i n g respondent Law Firm 
to represent appel lants . 
5. Respondent Law Firm did l ega l r e s e a r c h , sought and 
obtained after some dispute a large volume of medical records, on 
June 19, 1984, f i l e d the requ i red 90-day Notice of I n t e n t to 
Commence an Action, met repeatedly with appel lants , prepared a 
C o m p l a i n t , and engaged in s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th 
defendants' at torneys over a s ign i f ican t period of time. 
6. Respondent Law Firm obta ined a s e t t l e m e n t offer of 
$39,984.31 for a p p e l l a n t s ' c a se . (Record, p.50). The s e t t l e m e n t 
offer l e t t e r dated June 25, 1984 from Snow, Chr i s tensen & 
Martineau is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made 
a par t hereof. 
7. Appellants refused to accept the offer of set t lement and 
Mr. Ph i l l ips was deceased at the time of the proceedings in the 
D i s t r i c t Court. 
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terminated representation by respondent Law Firm, wherein they 
had agreed to pay a one-third (1/3) contingency fee, plus a 
retainer for costs in the amount of $500. Thereafter they 
retained their current attorneys with an agreement to pay said 
attorneys only a one-quarter (1/4) contingency fee with no 
retainer for costs. (Supplemental Affidavit of Michael L. 
Deamer, Record, p.88). 
8. Shortly after respondent Law Firm was terminated, it 
filed for recording in the office of the County Recorder of both 
Utah and Salt Lake Counties, a Notice of Attorney's Lien in the 
amount of $13,161.44. (Copies in Record, p.55-58). 
9. After termination of respondent Law Firm, respondent Law 
Firm refunded the unused balance of costs advanced by appellants, 
fully cooperated with appellant's new attorney Mr. Harrison, and 
acted in all regards to preserve appellants' case. 
10. Approximately eight months later appellants settled 
their case out of court on terms identical to the settlement 
offer previously obtained by respondent Law Firm. (Supplemental 
Affidavit of Michael L. Deamer, Record, p.87-88). 
11. The attorney for defendants Dr. J. A. Smith, Jr. and the 
University Medical Center (not parties to this appeal) filed a 
3The case was settled for $20,000 cash, plus a pass-through of 
insurance proceeds due the defendants for Mr. Phillips' treatment 
in the amount of $19,984.31. 
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motion with the court for determination of Law Firm's attorneys1 
fee. (Record, p.122) 
12. The attorney for appellants, Mr. Harrison, stipulated 
that the court could hear and determine the issue of respondent's 
attorneys' fees on the record in this proceeding. Quoted in 
Argument, Point I. 
13. In the course of proceeding on this matter, appellants' 
attorney has refused to sign Orders approving them as to form, 
has sought a rehearing of the Court's ruling, which was denied, 
and furthermore has not posted the bond required for an appeal to 
this Court or made other acceptable arrangements regarding 
settlement proceeds that appellants have already received 
constituting the fee that respondent Law Firm seeks to obtain. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants are estopped from asserting the necessity of 
a separate action to determine fees because they waived their 
right to a separate hearing. 
2. There are no material issues of fact to be resolved. 
3. Respondent is entitled to its attorney's liens and fees 
pursuant to written contract and statutes of the State of Utah 
for legal services rendered. 
4. Respondent Law Firm is entitled to an award of 





APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE NECESSITY 
OF A SEPARATE ACTION TO DETERMINE FEES. 
The appellants claim error in the fact that the District 
Court made a determination of fees without a separate action 
being brought by Law Firm to recover the same. Yet, at the same 
time, the only relief requested is a remand to the District Court 
for the purpose of taking additional evidence. 
The parties are the same, the venue is the same, and 
appellants, by stipulation, waived the necessity of a separate 
action for fees, even if a separate action for recovery of fees 
were otherwise required. 
The stipulation of appellants1 counsel was as follows (See 
Record, pp.124-125; 128-129): 
"The Court : I s i t s t i p u l a t e d t h a t I can hear t h i s 
ma t t e r with regards to the l i e n , a t t o r n e y ' s l i e n for 
fees in t h i s matter? 
"Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
"The Court : So, t h e r e w i l l be no need for any type of 
f u r t h e r a c t i o n and based upon what i s p re sen ted to me 
today I_ can make a. d e c i s i o n as to whether or not 
they1re e n t i t l e d to fees . (Emphasis added). 
"Mr. Har r i son : I th ink i f the Court looks a t the law 
— I brought a case t h a t should be d i s p o s i t i v e on the 
i ssue , your Honor, and I believe once the court reviews 
that case tha t the course wi l l be c lear . 
"So, I guess with t h a t p r o v i s i o n t h a t I sugges t t h a t I 
think the court should hear the issue of the a t torney 's 
l i en that was f i led by predecessor counsel, and I think 
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that it is appropriate prior to defendant's and our 
settlement being entered as a court order. 
"The Court: Is that agreeable with all parties, then? 
"Mr. Randle: That's agreed, your Honor. 
"The Court: Is that agreeable, Mr. Harrison? 
"Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
*** 
"The C o u r t : So, we a l l u n d e r s t a n d t h a t I w i l l 
determine, f i r s t of a l l , whether they have a r ight to a 
l i en . If they have a r ight to a l i en , there may be the 
n e c e s s i t y of an e v i d e n t i a r y hear ing to determine the 
amount of fees you're en t i t l ed t o . 
" Is t h a t s t i p u l a t e d to by a l l p a r t i e s , t h a t t h a t i s the 
issue before me? 
"Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
"Mr. Randle: Yes. 
Appellant cannot now be heard to say that respondent Law Firm 
must bring a separate action in the lower court to adjudicate its 
rights to attorneys' fees. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT TO BE RESOLVED. 
Appellants' counsel was responsible for suggesting that 
additional facts be submitted by affidavit. (Record, p.150). No 
additional hearing was requested nor did appellants' counsel 
raise any procedural objection to the manner of proceeding, until 
after the District Court had ruled. 
It is claimed that material issues of fact were raised by 
7 
the affidavits that precluded the District Court from awarding 
fees to this Law Firm. Appellants1 Brief does not clearly 
outline what the alleged factual disputes are. 
The big point they sought to make in the District Court, and 
apparently seek to make before this Court, is that there was no 
acceptance of the defendants1 June 25, 1984 offer, and therefore 
this Law Firm had not completed its contract and was not entitled 
to a lien or fees. 
Whether or not respondent Law Firm had actually achieved 
final settlement was completely immaterial to the decision of the 
District Court, because the efforts of counsel had produced an 
unconditional offer of settlement, and the only reason the 
settlement was not consummated was that the appellants refused, 
at that point in time, to accept it. The following comments of 
the Court are illustrative of its reasoning (Record, pp.136-138): 
"The Court: So, after that transaction and those 
negotiations, then Mr. Harrison was then engaged, after 
the $39,000 offer was made? 
"Mr. Randle: Yes. 
"The Court: What is your understanding, Mr. Harrison. 
"Mr. Harrison: My understanding was the P h i l l i p s came 
to my office and sa id , "Look, we're not happy with—" 
"The Court: Did they t e l l you what they had been 
offered at tha t time. 
"Mr. Har r i son : No. They advised t h a t they had the 
l e t t e r . I looked at i t . 
"The Court : So, your tes t imony i s t h a t you were not 
aware of the fac t t h a t they had an offer in hand for 
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$39,000 plus? 
"Mr, Harrison: That is co r rec t . 
"The Court: You may proceed, 
"Mr. H a r r i s o n : So a t t h a t p o i n t I commenced 
representa t ion . 
"I guess I would note t h a t the l e t t e r t h a t counsel 
r e l i e s on apparently is a l e t t e r also in June from Mr. 
Lybbe r t where aga in i t i s a p roposed o f f e r of 
se t t lement , but i t i s not a confirmation. And I think 
tha t is e ssen t ia l for the c o u r t ' s determination here. 
"The l a s t paragraph says i t w i l l r e q u i r e one week to 
process a set t lement draft after receiving no t i f i ca t ion 
of acceptance. 
"That was the problem, the P h i l l i p s would not accept 
the set t lement offered. 
"The Court: But they had an offer of $39,000. 
"Mr. Harrison: May have. 
"The Court: According to Mr. Lybbert's l e t t e r they did 
have an o f fe r . If the P h i l l i p s accepted i t , they 
s t ruck a d e a l . He would order a d r a f t and prepare a 
release and that would have taken care of the case. 
"Mr. H a r r i s o n . But a p p a r e n t l y t hey were not 
s a t i s f i e d . As I have found through my months of 
r e p r e s e n t i n g them, they j u s t were very d i f f i c u l t to 
deal with in the sense of coming to accept a formal 
se t t lement . 
"I would sugges t , your Honor, if we can turn to t h i s 
case t h a t i s very impor t an t , because I be l i eve i t i s 
r i g h t on p o i n t . I t i s a 1968 case and i t t a l k s about 
the fac t t h a t a charging l i e n , which i s the kind of 
l i en we're talking about, does not at tach when the work 
is s t e r i l e or produces no f r u i t , and when, in fact , you 
withdraw from the case at the time that there is a law 
s u i t yet to be t r i e d . 
"The Court: I don ' t agree with t h a t s t a t e m e n t . I 
don't think the case was s t e r i l e at that time. Instead 
the a t t o r n e y was producing f r u i t . In t h i s case i t 
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appears that he had $39,000. 
"Mr. Harrison: Well, I guess I would respond by saying 
tha t the pa r t i e s— 
"The C o u r t : The a t t o r n e y s n e g o t i a t e d a $39,000 
s e t t l e m e n t a t t h a t j u n c t u r e , and the f ac t t h a t the 
P h i l l i p s would not accept i t was not the f a u l t of the 
a t t o r n e y s . But they did n e g o t i a t e a s e t t l e m e n t worth 
$39,000. 
"Therefore, I don ' t think the i r e f for t s were s t e r i l e . 
There is no dispute that appel lants retained respondent Law 
Firm to represent them. There is no dispute that they .authorized 
respondent Law Firm to n e g o t i a t e a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e i r c la ims 
with de fendan t s . There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t those n e g o t i a t i o n s 
resul ted in the formal offer of set t lement shown in Exhibit "A", 
p r i o r to the t e r m i n a t i o n of respondent Law Firm's employment. 
There is no dispute that appel lants refused to accept the wr i t ten 
o f f e r when p r e s e n t e d to them. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t s subsequen t ly accepted the same terms of s e t t l e m e n t . 
There i s no d i s p u t e as to the amount of fees earned by respondent 
Law Firm if the D i s t r i c t Court ' s Order i s affirmed. 
POINT I I I 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S LIEN AND FEES 
PURSUANT TO WRITTEN CONTRACT AND STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH FOR LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED. 
Respondent claims entitlement to a lien upon the proceeds of 
the settlement pursuant to (1) its written agreement attached as 
Exhibit "C" to appellants' Brief, and (2) the provisions of Utah 
law. 
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Utah Code Annotated 78-52-41 provides: 
"Compensation - lien - The compensation of an attorney 
and counsel for his services is governed by agreement, 
express or implied, which is not restrained by law. 
From the commencement of an action, or the service of 
an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who 
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause 
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor and 
to the proceeds thereof in whosoever's hands they may 
come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between 
the parties before or after judgment." 
The above cited statute provides that an attorney has a lien 
on his client's cause of action, which lien attaches to a 
judgment in his client's favor and "... to the proceeds thereof, 
in whosoever's hands they may come...". Furthermore, said lien 
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before 
or after judgment. 
In order for respondent Law Firm to take legal action as 
against the University Medical Center, it was required to file at 
least a 90-day notice pursuant to statute with the State Agency 
of a Claim and Notice of Intent to Commence an Action, which was 
done on January 19, 1984. Prior to this time, respondent Law 
Firm had spent a considerable amount of time researching the case 
and in attempting to obtain a large volume of medical records 
from the University Medical Center, which were subsequently 
obtained. Respondent Law Firm's counsel handling the matter, 
Michael L. Deamer and W. Jerry Ungricht, met with plaintiffs on 
numerous occasions in February, March and April to redefine the 
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facts and prepare the case. On March 28f 1984, at a point in 
time when plaintiffs could not file a legal action because the 
90-day statutory period had not run, respondent Law Firm met in 
settlement conference with Merlin Lybbert, the attorney for the 
health care providers, to discuss an out-of-court settlement. A 
complaint and documents to be filed with the Court were prepared 
but were never filed. Serious settlement negotiations continued 
and there was an exchange of correspondence. Ultimately, 
respondent Law Firm obtained for appellants the offer noted. The 
offer was in excess of what respondent Law Firm had evaluated the 
case to be worth and strongly encouraged appellants to accept it. 
The Courts have long recognized the right of an attorney to 
a charging lien for his services to secure compensation for 
obtaining a settlement for his client. The attorney's lien 
recognized by common law gives the attorney the right to recover 
his taxable costs and his fees and money expended on behalf of 
his client from a fund recovered by his aid: 
"... and the right to have the court interfere to 
prevent payment by the judgment debtor to the creditor 
in fraud of the attorney's right to it and to prevent 
or set aside assignments or settlements made in fraud 
of his right. It entitles the attorney to apply to the 
court for disbursement of proceeds realized by the 
enforcement of the judgment." 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys 
at Law, §324 at p. 337 citing the well established case 
of Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12, 15 L.ed. 348, 26 S.Ct. 
218, (1906). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Midvale Motors v. Saunders, 21 U2d 
181, 442 P2d 938 (1968), although holding that the attorney in 
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that specific case was not entitled to a lien since he was 
discharged at a point in time when he had achieved no results, 
stated: 
"It is to be noted that the statute above set out gives 
to an attorney what is called a charging lien which 
attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in 
his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof, etc." 
At the time of the order purportedly giving liens to 
the attorney, the plaintiff had no verdict, report, 
decision or judgment in his favor and, of course, he 
had not proceeds therefrom. The statute gives a. lien 
to the attorney on the fruits of his labor so as to 
protect him against an unjust enrichment on the part of 
a. nonpaying client. It is not intended to give a 
general lien on any other assets of the client. If the 
attorney's work is sterile and produces no fruit, then 
he has no lien". At p. 184. (Emphasis added). 
Respondent in the present case through preparation and 
negotiation was able to obtain a settlement offer in the amount 
of $39,984.31. At this point in time, the settlement offer 
changed from an unliquidated claim against defendants to a 
liquidated claim because the dollar amount was fixed. Therefore, 
respondent had produced a "fruit" that was ascertainable and 
fixed for which respondent is entitled to receive its one-third 
contingency fee of $13,314.78. The law further provides that an 
attorney may assert a lien on money due his client even before 
judgment is rendered or to any funds recovered by an attorney for 
his client. See generally: 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law, §343 
at pp.349-350 citing Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. 415, 414 L.ed. 753 
(1853). 
The Utah Statute provides that the lien attaches to the 
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judgment or proceeds theref rom: "..•from the commencement of an 
a c t i o n " . Responden t s u b m i t s t h a t i t s l i e n a t t a c h e d no t l a t e r 
than t h e d a t e when the cause of a c t i o n was f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t 
by a p p e l l a n t s or t h e d a t e r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d i t s N o t i c e of Lien 
wi th the S a l t Lake County and Utah County Recorder on August 16, 
1984. While t h e r e i s no f i l i n g r e q u i r e m e n t under Utah law 
r e q u i r i n g a Not ice of At to rney ' s Lien, the Supreme Court has held 
t h a t an a t t o r n e y ' s l i e n i s p e r f e c t e d by f i l i n g in t h e o f f i c e of 
t h e County Recorde r in t h e coun ty in which t h e a c t i o n was 
commenced. See : Nor ton v. M c l n i n c h , 50 U.253, 166 P2d 984. 
Fur thermore , Utah's At to rney ' s Lien S t a t u t e i s a remedia l s t a t u t e 
and t h e r e f o r e shou ld be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d . V i c t o r , Gold & 
S i l v e r Mining Co. v . Na t iona l Bank of Repub l i c , 18 U87, 55 P2d 
(1898) and 7 Am. J u r . 2d At to rneys a t Law, §325 a t p . 338. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT LAW FIRM IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS' FEES, COURT COSTS AND INTEREST 
PURSUANT TO CONTRACT. 
Respondent Law Firm pursuant to the written agreement 
between the parties seeks an award of an additional reasonable 
attorney's fees, court costs and interest pursuant to the 
contract between the parties. The contract provides: 
"In the event I [appellants] fail to pay the fees and 
costs when billed for whatever reason, I hereby grant 
my attorneys a lien on said legal matters and agree to 
pay interest on all amounts overdue 30 days or more at 
an annual percentage rate of 18% (one and one-half 
14 
percent per month) until paid, plus all court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to enforce collection." 
Pursuant to the above contractual provision, respondent is 
entitled to interest at 18% on its $13,314.78, from the time the 
settlement proceeds were paid over on February 4, 1985, to the 
date received, plus an award of costs and additional attorney's 
fees related to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent law firm submits that appellants stipulated in 
open court to allow the District Court to resolve the issue of 
attorney's fees. Appellant furthermore sought rehearings which 
were denied by the District Court. Appellant has no material 
factual issues to be resolved. Respondent Law Firm is entitled 
to an enforcement of its attorney's lien pursuant to contract and 
Utah Statute based upon the settlement proposal which respondent 
Law Firm obtained which was later accepted by appellants. The 
decision and order of the District Court that respondent Law Firm 
is entitled to $13,314.78 should be affirmed. Furthermore, 
pursuant to contract respondent Law Firm is entitled to an award 
of an additional attorney's fees, court costs and interest at 18% 
as provided by contract. 
DATED this /!> — day of January, 19-8-&; 
Stephen R. R a n d l e ^ ^ 
Attorneys for Respondent Law Firm 
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER 
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Mr. Michael L. Deamer 
Attorney at Law 
520 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Elmer Lee Phillips vs. University of Utah 
Hospital, et al. 
Dear Mike: 
After receiving your letter of June 21, 1984, I have 
taken occasion to meet with officials at the University and 
the proposal of settlement contained in your recent letter 
was carefully reviewed and considered. 
I am authorized to conclude a settlement of all claims 
with the Phillips on the following terms: 
1. A cash payment of $20,000.00. 
2. Payment of a further sum equal to any amount here-
after paid to the University Hospital for medical expenses by 
Mr. Phillips' insurance carrier, in connection with the ser-
vices rendered to Mr. Phillips at the University Hospital 
during the period of September 10, 1983 through October 21, 
1983. 
Hospital records indicate that the total charges for the 
period September 10 through September 18, 1983 are $5,965.81. 
The charges for the hospitalization commencing September 28, 
1983 through October 21, 1983 are $14,018.50. Thus, a total of 
$19,984.31 remains unpaid. 
We can make no representation as to what amount, if any, 
Mr. Phillips1 insurance carrier will eventually reimburse the 
r-
Mr. Michael L. Deamer 
Page 2 
June 25, 1984 
hospital for the services rendered. My inquiry indicates that 
someone on behalf of Mr. Phillips instructed his insurance car-
rier not to pay any of the hospital expenses. It would appear 
that before any of the charges are paid that a letter from Mr. 
Phillips, or someone on his behalf, will have to be directed to 
the insurance carrier requesting that such payments be made. 
If you do not have a copy of the letter, which I have not seen, 
I will attempt to secure a copy for you so that an appropriate 
letter may be prepared. 
It will require about one week to process, a settlement 
draft after receiving notification of acceptance. 
Very truly yours, 
CHRISTENSE* & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
MRL:m 
